The Americas’ Critical Minerals Moment

By working together, the Western Hemisphere can increase its economic independence and resilience.

The United States has a narrow window to reshape its economic future and its role in the Americas if it moves decisively. A network of special economic zones could secure critical minerals supply chains, compete with China, and catalyze growth across the Western Hemisphere. Designed with enforceable standards, it would demonstrate that the Americas can deliver long-term growth and security.

The Critical Minerals Challenge and Opportunity

Critical minerals are at the heart of technological dynamism and national security, powering everything from chips to grid-scale storage to defense platforms. Yet, most mines and refineries are concentrated in a few countries, with China being predominant across midstream processes. China processes more than 90 percent of the world’s battery-grade manganese sulfate, 70 percent of cobalt, nearly 60 percent of lithium, and 40 percent of copper, leaving manufacturers and US companies vulnerable to geopolitical shocks.

The Western Hemisphere offers a credible alternative. It holds one of the world’s richest concentrations of critical minerals, but lacks a common framework to knit these strengths together. The lithium triangle of Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile contains about half of the known global resources.

Latin America also dominates in copper production, with Chile producing 23 percent, Peru 12 percent, and Mexico nearly 4 percent of global output. Between 2022 and 2030, copper production is projected to rise by 30 percent in Peru and 15 percent in Chile. Brazil holds between 19 percent and 23 percent of global rare earth reserves, though its infrastructure lags behind some neighbors. Mexico is also the world’s sixth-largest producer of zinc, another critical mineral.

The Caribbean contributes bauxite and nickel, while Canada adds reserves of nickel, potash, cobalt, and rare earth potential, along with advanced mining technology, strong environmental safeguards, and permitting expertise. Mexico and Canada, both integral parts of the USMA trade agreement, can contribute a great deal. Taken together, the Americas already possess the building blocks of a secure and complete supply chain; the challenge is organizing them into a coherent strategy.

Washington’s Past Efforts and Today’s Opening

Washington has tried to reset its economic approach to the hemisphere, but with limited results. The first Trump administration’s América Crece (Growth in the Americas) and the Biden administration’s Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity (APEP) faded without real investment at scale, while the bipartisan Americas Act, designed to deepen integration, is still winding its way through Congress. Today, however, conditions are ripe for a more ambitious strategy. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has placed new emphasis on the hemisphere, and the White House is prioritizing supply chain security and critical minerals, as evident in the recent deal among the Quad nations on mineral supply chains.

The moment is ripe for a bold approach. If the United States does not lead, it will be responding to others. China is already South America’s top export market and a dominant force in mineral supply chains, accounting in 2021 for 65 percent of Chile’s mineral exports, amounting to about 6 percent of Chile’s GDP. With a new framework that facilitates trade and strengthens business-to-business connections, Washington can help reverse this trend.

Harnessing Strengths Close to Home

A US‑backed network of special economic zones driven by partner nations and the private sector could link mines, refineries, railways, factories, and ports into a coherent hemispheric supply chain, de‑risking from China. With high standards plus blended financing, such a framework could evolve into a durable public–private platform that weathers commodity cycles and technological shifts.

Success will rest on three elements: incentives, guardrails, and infrastructure. An initial cohort of countries would adopt enforceable standards, with goods that meet them qualifying for incentives and procurement access in member markets, consistent with domestic law. New partners could join through a rules‑based accession process that verifies compliance. Original members could agree on standards for the mining and treatment of minerals that would grant them “domestically produced” status across all member markets.

Shared policy and economic alignment would give investors certainty for projects that take years to mature, with some projects fully private and others structured as public-private partnerships backed by the US Export‑Import Bank, the US Development Finance Corporation, and regional development banks. Comparable models have mobilized capital elsewhere. For instance, the Lobito Corridor in Africa pairs public commitments with private finance to unlock rail and port infrastructure for critical minerals.

Incentives should be clear and reciprocal. Materials and components produced in qualifying zones should receive tax benefits or procurement preferences across member countries, especially where national security objectives apply. Other regions are moving: Tanzania and other African states are expanding SEZs tied to minerals processing; Australia legislated a 10 percent refundable production tax incentive for critical minerals processing and refining; and the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act designates “strategic projects” with accelerated permitting and other facilitation. 

Guardrails are essential. Partners must screen inbound and outbound investment and exclude firms whose participation would create new dependencies or undermine supply‑chain resilience. Companies backed by the Chinese state should not benefit from a system designed to reduce the very vulnerabilities their involvement would introduce, while restrictions must be clear so legitimate investors can plan with confidence.